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While Centers for Disease Control and Prevention believe that most state
governments under-fund tobacco-control programs, little is known about
why large variation in spending exists between state governments. This
study explores reasons for spending variation through an econometric
model of per capita spending on tobacco-control programs that explores
the effects of smoking prevalence while holding constant tobacco
settlement funds, state budget deficits, and other factors that might also
be expected to influence spending variation. Empirical evidence indicates
no support for the hypothesis that states with high smoking prevalence
spend more on tobacco-control than other states. This finding may be
quite surprising to those working in areas of public health and clearly leads
to many important policy questions regarding why the data indicate that
funding does not appear to bear any relation to perceived public health
problems as would be predicted if policymakers were following a ‘rational
needs’ approach to funding.

I. Introduction
Controlling tobacco use has become an important
policy issue addressed by state governments. State
governments spent $883 160 197 and $762 338 414 in
years 2001 and 2002, respectively, on tobacco-control
programs.1 Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) have established recommended
funding levels in Best Practices for Comprehensive
Tobacco Control Programs (1999) and currently
believe that actual (state and federal) spending in all
states is a little over one-half of ‘lower-bound’ or
minimum Best Practices spending recommendations.2
CDC believes that adequate funding of tobacco
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control programs would reduce the number of
adults who smoke by promoting quitting, prevent
young people from ever starting, reduce exposure to
secondhand smoke, and identify and eliminate
disparities in tobacco use among population groups.
Despite literature indicating effectiveness of
tobacco control programs, little is known about
how state spending decisions on tobacco-control
programs are determined and, more specifically,
why there exists substantial variation in funding of
state programs.3 As described below, average per
capita state funding was $3.18 in 2001 and $3.27 in
2002, with ranges of $0–$20.69 in 2001 and $0–$18.15
in 2002. If variation can be shown to be

CDC (1999). Arizona and Massachusetts did not provide data for 2002 because their budgets had not been finalized at the
time the CDC’s publication went to press.
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Best Practices spending is estimated based on nine program elements: community programs to reduce tobacco use; chronic
disease programs to reduce the burden of tobacco-related diseases; school programs; enforcement; statewide programs;
counter-marketing; cessation programs; surveillance and evaluation; and administration and management.
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See, for example, Hu et al. (1995a, b), Farrelly et al. (2003) and Tauras et al. (2005).

systematically related to factors that reflect urgency
of public health concerns, such as differences in
smoking prevalence, then variation would appear to
promote CDC’s goal of controlling tobacco use
within the country as a whole. If, for example, highspending states were also those with the highest
prevalence of smoking, then funding variation might
reflect an efficient allocation of funding resources.
For instance, systematically spending more in states
characterized by relatively high tobacco use and less
in states with relatively low tobacco use might be
justified if the goal is to lower national tobacco use
toward some pre-determined goal.
This study seeks to determine the degree to which
spending variation is systematically related to factors
that reflect urgency of public health concerns. This
study uses a newly-available and publicly-available
data set on tobacco-control expenditures during 2001
and 2002 in which over $1.6 billion were allocated.4
Reasons for this variation are explored through an
econometric model of spending on tobacco-control
programs that explores the independent effects of
smoking prevalence while holding constant tobacco
settlement funds, state budget deficits, and other
factors that might also be expected to influence
spending variation between states.

II. Spending on Tobacco-Control Programs
State spending on tobacco control programs comes
from a variety of sources. In 2002, for instance,
46 states received more than $6 billion in tobacco
settlement revenues (Master Settlement Agreement),
and the four states – Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi
and Texas that settled independently with the
tobacco industry also received substantial revenue.5
Settlement revenues were based on a formula that
included smoking-attributable state Medicaid
expenses. The Master Settlement Agreement did not
dictate how funds were to be allocated, although the
public health community had hoped that states would
significantly expand funding of tobacco-control
programs. Recent evidence, however, indicates that
4

relatively few settlement dollars have gone toward
tobacco-control and there is some perception that
many of these dollars have gone toward closing state
government deficits and costs associated with general
health care programs.6 Keeler et al. (2004) argue that,
in reaction to the Master Settlement Agreement of
1998, advertising by tobacco firms rose and partially
offset (from 33 to 57%) effects of higher cigarette
prices thus suggesting that effects of the tobacco
settlement on smoking prevalence are complicated to
predict.
It should be understood, however, that an account
ing of where tobacco settlement revenues have been
allocated cannot provide a clear picture of overall
state spending on tobacco-control. State governments
fund tobacco control programs through a variety of
general sources such as income and property taxes as
well as from more specific revenue sources such as
taxes on tobacco and alcohol. For example, 12 states
appropriated $14 million from general revenue to
support tobacco control programs in 2002.7 Over
$8 billion in 2004 was collected in cigarette tax
revenue in the 50 states and some of these dollars
could also have funded tobacco-control programs.8
Government funds are fungible in the sense that an
increase in funding from a specific revenue source
such as the tobacco settlement may take place at the
same time that funds from other sources rise, fall or
remain the same. In other words, budgeting is
dynamic in the sense that a change in funding from
one source may trigger a change in another source.9
If a state allocates $50 million from settlement funds
to fund tobacco-control programs, the same state
may at the same time raise or lower allocations from
excise taxes, income taxes, or property taxes that
result in increases, decreases or no changes in overall
funding of tobacco-control programs.10 Total spend
ing on tobacco-control is the correct metric to
examine, not individual funding sources in this
dynamic funding world. This discussion is not
meant to argue that examination of how state
governments allocate funds from the tobacco settle
ment, or from other sources such as excise taxes on
tobacco, is not useful. Clearly, increased spending on
tobacco-control must be funded from somewhere and

CDC (2001) and CDC (2002).
GAO (2004).
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See e.g. Gross et al. (2002), Johnson (2004) and Sloan et al. (2005).
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CDC (2002).
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Orzechowski and Walker (2004).
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Marlow and Shiers (1999) discuss this issue when they examine whether higher public funding of crime-related programs
leads to changes in public education funding.
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Funding also comes from federal and private sources. Federal funding comes from CDC’s Office on Smoking and Health
that manages the National Tobacco Control Program and the Health and Human Service’s (HHS) Substance Abuser and
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA); see CDC (2002).
5

Table 1. Descriptive statistics: tobacco control expenditures
per capita

Average ($)
Median ($)
Maximum ($)
Minimum ($)
SD
Sample size

State
2001

Federal
2001

State
2002

Federal
2002

3.18
2.23
20.69
0
3.97
50

0.56
0.31
2.70
0.04
0.57
50

3.27
2.77
18.15
0
3.42
48

0.73
0.44
3.17
0.05
0.68
48

public heath advocates naturally scrutinize current
spending allocations from tobacco-related revenue
sources. Data examined in this article – tobaccocontrol spending – reflect final overall funding of
tobacco control programs as defined by CDC and
reflect final allocations from multiple revenue
sources.11
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of per capita
spending on tobacco-control programs in 2001 and
2002. Data are available for all 50 states in 2001 and
48 states in 2002. Funding estimates were not
available at the time of publication for Arizona and
Massachusetts. Average per capita state funding was
$3.18 in 2001 and $3.27 in 2002, with ranges of $0
(Connecticut, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania and Tennessee) to $20.69 (Ohio) in
2001 and $0 (Tennessee) to $18.15 (Ohio) in 2002.
Median per capita state spending was $2.23 in 2001
and $2.77 in 2002. Average per capita federal funding
was $0.56 in 2001 and $0.73 in 2002, with ranges of
$0.04 (California) to $2.70 (Vermont) in 2001 and
$0.05 (Florida) to $3.18 (Vermont) in 2002. Median
per capita federal spending was $0.31 in 2001 and
$0.44 in 2002. The data therefore indicate substantial
variation in state spending and that state spending
dominates overall spending. The data are not
disaggregated and we cannot single out various
programs such as counter-advertising expenditures
vs. counselling expenditures vs. any other spending
category. This is unfortunate because substantial
variation in how states allocate funds to various
programs is likely and it would be useful to observe
how states choose among competing spending
options. Such information might prove useful in
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determining relative effectiveness of competing
spending options in controlling tobacco use.
Gross et al. (2002) study state spending in 2001 and
is the only empirical study that directly examines
variation in state tobacco-control spending. Primary
conclusions are that state health issues (e.g. Medicaid
expenditures and proportion of the population
without health insurance) exert little effect on state
spending and therefore tobacco settlement funds
represent a mostly untapped revenue source for
expanding state tobacco-control programs. While
this study examined numerous variables that might
influence tobacco-control spending, the statistical
techniques used do not lend themselves to estimating
causal determinants of tobacco-control spending.
Stepwise regression and Spearman’s rank correlation
were the two methods used to examine data. The
stepwise regression process was based on the criteria
that variables with p � 0.10 would be retained and,
in effect, is a technique designed to maximize R2’s of
estimated equations.12 Stepwise regression is an
exercise that, in effect, forces data to determine the
model and is not very useful to test hypotheses
stemming from theory involving a dependent variable
and two or more independent variables. Estimation
of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients is suitable
for considering only the relationship between two
variables and thus does not appear to be suitable for
an investigation of why spending on tobacco-control
varies widely between states.

III. Modelling Determinants of State
Tobacco-Control Funding
Tobacco-control programs are, in theory, aimed at
curbing smoking prevalence which suggests that an
efficient allocation funds on the basis of smoking
prevalence. That is, states with higher smoking
prevalence would receive greater funding than states
with lower prevalence as long as greater funding is
believed to lower prevalence. Therefore, an efficient
allocation of resources across states would yield a
positive relation between funding and prevalence.
This prediction is consistent within a world where

CDC (2002) notes limitations to its data collection. Reported amounts exclude appropriations for multiple purposes that
included an unspecified amount of funding for tobacco control. State spending data are based on appropriations, rather than
expenditures, and expenditures may differ from appropriated amounts, because of delays in implementation, program cuts, or
establishment of trusts or endowments.
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As Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991, p. 88) state: ‘While stepwise regression can be useful in looking at data when there are a
large number of possible explanatory variables, it is of little value when one is attempting to analyze a model statistically.
The reason is that t and F-tests consider the test of a null hypothesis under the assumption that the model is correctly
specified.’

resources are allocated within a central planning
model whereby policymakers attempt to allocate
resources toward highest-valued uses.13
A similar prediction would arise under a federalist
system of state governments. State officials might also
allocate more resources in states with higher pre
valence because needs are presumably greater in these
states than states with lower prevalence. For example,
it is predictable that cold weather states spend more
on snow removal than warm climate states since
that’s where the snow is. States with more smokers
could then be predicted to spend more on tobaccocontrol than states with fewer smokers as long as
policymakers are efficiently allocating resources
under the ‘rational needs’ approach to funding and
believe that greater funding lowers prevalence.
An important implication here is that there should
be some clear pattern or order concerning tobaccocontrol funding when resources are allocated effi
ciently across states. This pattern is also not
dependent upon resources being allocated by a
central government because a federalist system of
state governments would follow a similar pattern as
long as they are interested in efficiently allocating
resources with the goal of curbing smoking pre
valence. States with high prevalence should therefore
exhibit more spending on tobacco-control than states
with low prevalence since otherwise it is as if snow
removal does not bear any connection to climate.
Moreover, even if states within a federalist system do
not follow the ‘rational needs’ approach, the central
government may promote the ‘rational needs’
approach to funding by granting funds to states on
the basis of supporting a pattern whereby total – state
and central funding is positively related to smoking
prevalence.
Endogeneity is an issue of concern if the causal
relationship between tobacco-control spending and
smoking prevalence is actually two-way. While
smoking prevalence may influence tobacco-control
spending, another direction may be that tobaccocontrol spending influences smoking prevalence.
Disentanglement of these two causal effects is a
critical issue here because otherwise we cannot
distinguish between two very different interpretations
13

of the literature’s finding that tobacco-control
spending lowers tobacco use.14 While authors of
previous studies have argued that tobacco-control
spending causes lower tobacco use, a counterinterpretation is that lower smoking prevalence
causes higher tobacco-control spending as consistent
with the hypothesis that states with less tolerance for
smoking (as indicated by relatively low smoking
prevalence) will also fund tobacco-control programs
more generously. Separation of these effects is
essential when we wish to examine effectiveness of
tobacco-control programs and whether the direction
and magnitude of state spending on control programs
should be altered. The possibility of two-way
causality between tobacco-control spending and
smoking prevalence is addressed by estimating
models of tobacco-control spending with two-stage
least squares. Ordinary least squares produces biased
and inconsistent estimates of coefficients in the
presence of simultaneity.
The following model of state spending on tobaccocontrol is estimated by two-stage least squares for
each of 2 years, 2001 and 2002.
FUNDi ¼ fðYi ,TSi , UEi , DEBTi ,FOURi ,SMOKERi Þ
ð1Þ
The first-stage equation is
SMOKERi ¼ fðYi ,TSi ,UEi ,DEBTi ,FOURi ,
POPULATIONi ,DENSITYi ,TOBSTATEi Þ
ð2Þ

The instruments for the first-stage estimation are
all independent variables in Equation 1 except
SMOKERi and the addition of the following
variables: state population, urban density, and a
dichotomous variable that equals one if the state has
a significant tobacco manufacturing presence
(Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Ohio, South
Carolina and Virginia) and zero otherwise. Variables
are defined along with summary statistics in Table 2.
State per capita funding of tobacco-control pro
grams (FUNDi) is obtained from the previously
discussed CDC data set. State median income of a
four-person family (Yi) is obtained from the US

An economically efficient allocation does not necessarily mean that states with high prevalence should spend more on
control if, for instance, programs are not equally effective or when states have heterogeneous policy objectives. Differences in
demographics across states might also lead to spending differences across states under a ‘rational needs’ approach. For
example, Yen (2005) finds that smoking falls with education, but older smokers consume more cigarettes than younger
smokers, in the USA. Goel and Nelson (2005) find significant differences in tobacco consumption across age and gender as
well in the USA. Following the Bask and Melkersson (2004) argument that alcohol and cigarette consumption are
simultaneous decisions, tobacco-control policy should perhaps also be influenced by alcohol consumption in states. Such
differences might suggest, for instance, that state spending should differ according to age, gender and other characteristics of
the population, even when states have similar overall smoking prevalence.
14
See Hu et al.(1995a, b), Farrelly et al. (2003) and Tauras et al. (2005).

Table 2. Summary statistics of variables, 2002
Definition

Mean

Median

Minimum

Maximum

POPULATIONi ¼ state population in thousands
DENSITYi ¼ urban-percent of state population
TOBSTATEi ¼ 1 if tobacco-producing state; ¼ 0 otherwise
FUNDi ¼ state per capita funding of tobacco-control programs ($)
TSi ¼ state per capita tobacco settlement funds ($)
UEi ¼ state unemployment rate (%)
Yi ¼ state median income of a four-person family ($)
FOURSTATEi ¼ for states with long-standing programs; ¼ 0 otherwise
DEBTi ¼ state government per capita deficit or surplus ($)
SMOKERi ¼ percent of adult population who smoke (%)

5747
71.7%
0.12
3.27
31.86
5.32
$58 633
0.08
$182.19
23.41

4098
71.5
0.0
2.77
30.60
5.40
$57 624
0.0
$134.74
23.15

499
38.2
0.0
0
13.62
3.3
$44 947
0.0
$�295.74
12.70

34 988
94.4
1.0
18.15
73.35
7.6
$75 505
1.0
$1171.72
32.60

Census and is hypothesized to be positively related to
tobacco-control spending based on the expectation
that such funding is a ‘normal’ good – voters demand
higher funding as their incomes rise. State per capita
tobacco settlement funds (TSi) is hypothesized to be
positively related to tobacco-control spending based
on expectation that some portion of these revenues
would flow into tobacco-control programs. These
data are reported in McKinley et al. (2003) and
include funds by all states regardless of whether or
not they participated in the Master Settlement
Agreement. Inclusion of a dichotomous variable
reflecting whether or not a state participated in the
Master Settlement Agreement did not affect results
of this article and so are not displayed here.
The state unemployment rate (UEi) controls for the
economic condition of states and is obtained from
Census data. It is expected to negatively influence
tobacco-control spending because higher values
indicate greater concerns with income-stabilization
concerns of state governments which then may cause
states to lower funding of tobacco-control.
If tobacco-control is viewed as a longer-term problem
by state legislatures and governors, they may be
willing to forgo some of its funding as unemployment
rises. State government deficit or surplus per capita
(DEBTi) is included to control for the expectation
that higher deficits indicate greater fiscal duress that
results in lower spending on tobacco-control.
A dichotomous variable (FOURi) equals one for
the four states (Arizona, California, Massachusetts
and Oregon) with long-standing and comprehensive
tobacco-control programs; and equals zero otherwise.
These four states were early pioneers in tobaccocontrol programs since most states have only recently
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CDC (2001) and CDC (2002).
See CDC (2004).

been funding programs in a comprehensive effort
aimed at lowering tobacco use.15 It is expected that
these four states will more generously fund state
tobacco-control programs and so this variable is
hypothesized to be positively related to tobaccocontrol spending.
The percent of the adult population who smoke
(SMOKERi) controls for the perceived need to fund
tobacco-control by policymakers as well as public
sentiment regarding smoking. Cigarette smoking
is defined as persons who reported having smoked
100 or more cigarettes during their lifetime and who
currently smoke every day or some days and
is based on the Behavioural Risk Factor
Surveillance System, a telephone survey of health
behaviours of the civilian, noninstitutionalized US
population, 18 years old and over.16 The expected
sign on SMOKERi is ambiguous. The ‘rational needs’
allocation framework predicts that higher funding
arises with greater needs as indicated by higher
smoking prevalence and so state officials spend
more on tobacco-control programs in states with
more smokers. However, higher smoking prevalence
may also indicate greater support for smoking and
therefore less public sentiment that state governments
should generously fund tobacco-control programs.
This possibility is consistent with previous research
showing that the probability that states pass laws
prohibiting smoking in public places is influenced by
factors such as whether states have significant degrees
of tobacco-related jobs and smokers. Dunham and
Marlow (2000) find that presences of a state smoking
law are influenced by whether or not a state has a
significant tobacco presence and Hersch et al. (2004)
find that state smoking laws are responsive to voter

Measures
of
political
party
affiliation
(dichotomous variable equal to one if a state had a
democratic governor and zero otherwise, and share
of population voting for a democratic presidential
candidate) were included as explanatory variables
to examine whether political differences explained
any of the variation in tobacco-control spending
across states. Results with these measures are not
displayed here because they were not found to exert
statistically significant effects on tobacco-control
spending.
It is possible that there might be differential
variance by size of state. Equations are estimated
with SE and variances that are computed using
White’s (1980) covariance estimator which estimates
the coefficient covariances in the presence of hetero
skedasticity of unknown form. These estimates
provided a slight gain in statistical significance of
several variables over estimates using ordinary least
squares and so these estimates are displayed in this
article.

preferences in a state. These results suggest that,
because states with relatively few smokers or tobaccorelated jobs are more likely to pass laws prohibiting
smoking, states with relatively few smokers may be
more likely to generously fund tobacco-control
programs. Given the conflicting hypotheses, the sign
on SMOKERi is an empirical question to be resolved
through data examination.
A measure of youth smoking was also considered
as a control for public sentiment regarding smoking.
State control efforts are presumably also directed at
those initiating smoking, namely adolescents. Youth
smoking was measured as percent of current cigarette
smoking by students in grades 9–12 as defined by
having smoked cigarettes on 1 or more of the 30 days
preceding the survey. Data was obtained from
CDC (2002) and was available for 46 states in 2002.
Results are not displayed here because they did not
differ from the case of adult smoking prevalence and
because its use resulted in a smaller sample size.
Because the amount of settlement dollars per capita
is derived through estimation of smoking-related
Medicaid costs, it is possible that states with higher
smoking prevalence rates are likely to receive more
generous tobacco settlement allocations. That is, if
smoking prevalence is directly related to settlement
income, smoking prevalence and settlement funds
may be collinear. However, simple correlation
coefficients between smoking prevalence and state
per capita settlement funds are 0.05 (2001) and 0.04
(2002) thus suggesting that multi-collinearity between
SMOKERi and TSi is of little concern.

IV. Estimates of Tobacco-Control Spending
Equations
Table 3 displays two-stage least squares estimation of
state tobacco control spending in 2001 and 2002.
Three variables exhibit significant t-statistics (tobacco
settlement funds, unemployment rates, and four-state
dummy) in 2001 and four variables exhibit significant

Table 3. Two-stage least squares estimation of per capita state spending on tobacco- ontrol estimated coefficients
(1)

(2)

(3)

2001

2002

Smoker
Population
2.7E � 06
Urban
�0.55
Tobacco-state
2.21***
Tobacco settlement funds per capita 0.01
Unemployment
0.99*
Median income
1.4E � 05
Four state
�3.48*
Deficit/surplus per capita
0.003***
smoker
Constant
21.52*
Observations
50
F-Statistic
3.65
0.003
Prob(F-statistic)
R2 (adjusted)
0.30
Mean dependent variable
23.41

(4)

Tobacco-control
(0.04)
(1.60)
(1.83)
(0.34)
(3.08)
(0.26)
(3.14)
(1.69)

0.09***
�2.24***
�3.6E � 05
10.16**
�0.004
1.32
(8.54) �18.66
50
1.71
0.143
0.00
3.18

Smoker
�9.1
0.08**
3.08*
0.03
1.13*
�4.3E � 05
�1.94
�0.001

(1.92)
(2.01)
(0.44)
(2.38)
(0.83)
(1.50)
(1.09) 25.13*
48
3.67
0.003
0.30
23.41

Note: *, ** and *** Significance (two-tailed test) at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
t-statistics in parenthesis.

Tobacco-control
(1.24)
(2.10)
(2.76)
(0.84) 0.10*
(3.51)
(3.03) �1.10**
(2.07)
(0.90) �4.4E � 05 (0.76)
(1.51) 3.18*** (1.91)
(0.23) 0.003***
(1.99)
0.08
(0.29)
(8.81) 5.92
(0.76)
48
1.99
0.09
0.11
3.27

t-statistics in 2002 (tobacco settlement funds, unem
ployment rates, four-state dummy, and deficit/
surplus). However, estimation does not exceed critical
F-values using 2001 data and only barely exceeds the
critical F-value using 2002 data (p ¼ 0.09). Thus, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that, as a group, the
independent variables do not influence per capita
state spending on tobacco-control in 2001. We can
reject this hypothesis in 2002, but only 11% of the
variation in state spending on tobacco-control is
explained in this model. The estimated coefficient on
per capita tobacco settlement funds is 0.10 in 2002
and indicates that, for every additional settlement
dollar, states would spend 10 cents of that dollar on
tobacco-control.
First-stage estimation using 2001 data indicates
that the share of the adult population that smokes is
significantly influenced by whether or not the state
produces tobacco (positive effect), unemployment
rates (positive effect), whether the state has a longstanding tobacco-control program (negative effect),
and the deficit/surplus variable (positive effect).
Estimation using 2002 data indicates that the share
of the adult population that smokes is significantly
influenced by urbanization (positive effect), whether
or not the state produces tobacco (positive effect),
and unemployment rates (positive effect). Estimation
in both years exceeds critical F-values thus indicating
that we can reject the hypothesis that, as a group, the
independent variables do not influence smoking
prevalence.

Table 4 displays estimations of per capita state and
federal spending on tobacco-control to examine
whether our results change when we examine total
spending on tobacco-control. An examination of
total spending would be appropriate if state govern
ments base spending plans on expectations of federal
involvement. While one scenario is that states with
relatively high values of state spending exhibit high
prevalence to solicit federal funds through matching
grant and other types of federal programs, it is also
possible that state policymakers might view federal
spending more as a substitute for state spending.
Federal spending decisions might also somehow
smooth out state spending decisions in the sense
that states with greater needs – such as higher
smoking prevalence – receive greater federal spending
support. This latter possibility does not appear to be
operative because simple correlations between smok
ing prevalence and per capita federal spending are less
than 10% in both years.
Table 4 displays two-stage least squares estimation
of total (state and federal) tobacco control spending
in 2001 and 2002. The same variables exhibit
significant t-statistics as before in estimations of
state tobacco-control spending. We still cannot reject
the hypothesis that, as a group, the independent
variables do not influence per capita state and federal
spending on tobacco-control in 2001, but we can
reject this hypothesis in 2002. The estimated coeffi
cient on per capita tobacco settlement funds is 0.11 in
2002 and indicates that, for every additional

Table 4. Two-stage least squares estimation of per capita state and federal spending on tobacco-control estimated
coefficients
(1)

(2)

(3)

2001

2002

Smoker
Population
2.7E � 06
Urban
�0.05
Tobacco-state
2.21***
Tobacco settlement funds per capita
0.01
Unemployment
0.99*
Median income
1.4E � 05
Four state
�3.48*
Deficit/surplus per capita
0.003***
Smoker
Constant
21.52*
Observations
50
F-Statistic
3.65
0.003
Prob(F-statistic)
0.30
R2 (adjusted)
Mean dependent variable
23.41

(4)

(0.04)
(1.60)
(1.83)
(0.34)
(3.08)
(0.26)
(3.14)
(1.69)
0.76
(8.54)

Tobacco-control

Smoker

0.10**
�1.89***
�5.0E � 05
7.07**
�0.001
(1.16)
�6.05
50
1.76
0.130
0.00
3.73

�9.1
0.08**
3.08*
0.03
1.13*
�4.3E � 05
�1.94
�0.001
0.20
25.13*
48
3.67
0.003
0.30
23.41

(2.59)
(2.00)
(0.65)
(2.31)
(0.14)
(0.52)

Note: *, ** and *** Significance (two-tailed test) at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
t-statistics in parenthesis.

Tobacco-control
(1.24)
(2.10)
(2.76)
(0.84)
0.11*
(3.38)
(3.03) �1.53**
(2.56)
(0.90) �2.6E � 05 (0.41)
(1.51)
3.97**
(2.12)
(0.23)
0.004**
(2.28)
(0.68)
(8.81)
5.92
(0.76)
48
2.56
0.03
0.15
4.00

settlement dollar per capita, states would spend 11
cents of that dollar on tobacco-control. First-stage
estimations are identical to those previously discussed
in Table 3.

V. Conclusions
This study finds no evidence that tobacco-control
spending by state governments in 2001 was influenced
by tobacco settlement funds, unemployment rates,
median state income, prevalence of smokers, whether
or not a state had a long-standing tobacco-control
program, or by size of state government deficits or
surpluses. The empirical evidence thus indicates little
to no information on why tobacco-control spending
varied between states in 2001. In 2002, however,
evidence for four significant influences is indicated:
tobacco settlement funds exerted positive influences,
unemployment rates exerted negative influences, state
with long-standing programs exerted positive influ
ences, and deficits exerted positive influences on
tobacco-control spending. But, the model explains no
more than 15% of spending variation in 2002.
In sum, examined variables explain very little of the
variation in over $1.6 billion of spending in 2001
and 2002.
The main empirical finding that there is very little
or no correlation between tobacco-control and
smoking prevalence across states should be of
concern to those who believe in a ‘rational needs’
approach to public funding. This result is consistent
with studies showing that higher public health
spending does not necessarily lead to better health
outcomes. Berger and Messer (2002) examine the link
between public financing of health spending and
health outcomes across OECD countries and finds
that health outcomes are inversely related to the
proportion of their expenditures that are publicly
financed. Self and Grabowski (2003) conclude that,
while higher spending may raise health outcomes in
middle- to less-developed countries, there is little
evidence that higher public spending on health
improves health outcomes in wealthy countries.
The results may be quite surprising to those
working in areas of public health and clearly leads
to many important policy questions regarding why
the data indicate that funding does not appear to bear
any relation to perceived public health problems as
would be predicted if policymakers were following a
‘rational needs’ approach to funding. As previously
discussed, this empirical result might indicate that the
‘rational needs’ approach to funding is somehow
cancelled-out by efforts of groups who are not

motivated to curb smoking prevalence. Such groups
may include smokers themselves as well as businesses
that profit from sales of cigarettes such as retailers,
tobacco manufactures, and bars and taverns. Some
state governments may as well experience mixed
feelings regarding tobacco-control when they rely on
tobacco taxes to fund general government programs.
In other words, in states with high prevalence the
tendency to spend more due to health concerns may
be cancelled out by those with opposing interests
since it is more difficult to organize a lobby opposed
to smoking in states with many smokers. Weak or
nonexistent correlation between tobacco-control
funding and smoking prevalence supports this
explanation of why the funding data do not appear
to be based on the ‘rational needs’ approach.
If tobacco-control dollars are not following the
problem of smoking prevalence, is it possible that
dollars are following something else? One possibility
is that funding follows political support in some
states in the sense that more politicians and voters
sympathetic to tobacco-control are found in states
with low smoking prevalence and so it is easier to
raise money in states with fewer smokers. This
possibility might mean that the fact that a state
spends more and has low smoking prevalence may
not signify the effectiveness of tobacco-control
programs, but rather that it is just easier to raise
funds in a low-prevalence state. Funding unrelated to
smoking prevalence may then be consistent with a
world where some states follow the ‘rational needs’
approach and other states have funding levels
influenced more by those opposed to controlling
tobacco use. A similar question is whether states with
higher tobacco taxes may also be causing lower
smoking prevalence or does lower prevalence simply
make it easier to raise tobacco taxes in some states?
Better understanding of the determinants of tobaccocontrol allocations across states and whether or not
these allocations are causally-related to smoking
behaviour are issues that deserve further attention.
The results of this study would appear to suggest the
importance of re-examining recent proposals by the
CDC for substantial increases in tobacco-control
spending in light of the evidence showing little to no
connection between what states spend on tobaccocontrol and levels of smoking prevalence.
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